Bitcoin and Stellar are both advancing quantum-resistant security measures, but their respective paths show how difficult migration will be for users, custodians and infrastructure providers.
Bitcoin's exposed key problem has grown to 7.12 million BTC, or 35.4% of issued supply, according to Glassnode data from November 10. This is up from an earlier October estimate of more than 6 million BTC, or 31.2% of circulating coins. The exposure comes largely from address reuse, which Glassnode says accounts for 25.8% of supply, including 11.6% held on exchanges. While no publicly known quantum computer can currently break Bitcoin's elliptic-curve signatures, a sufficiently powerful future machine could derive private keys from visible public keys and take control of the funds.
Developers are split over how to respond. BIP 361, introduced in April by Jameson Lopp and five other developers, proposes a phased retirement of ECDSA and Schnorr signatures, with restrictions on vulnerable addresses over several years. Lopp argues restricting dormant holdings may be better than allowing future theft, while Blockstream CEO Adam Back supports voluntary upgrades and opposes fixed deadlines. A separate draft, BIP 360, proposes a Pay-to-Merkle-Root output type that removes Taproot's key-path spending option, but it does not independently add quantum-resistant signatures.
Cysic CEO Leo Fan warned that replacing Bitcoin's cryptography is not enough unless holders, exchanges and infrastructure providers can migrate. "The clock that matters is migration," he said, adding that coins that never move are a social problem rather than a technical one.
Custodians face extra complexity because multi-party computation and threshold signing systems are still developing post-quantum implementations. NIST finalized post-quantum signature standards in 2024, and in January 2026 issued a call for threshold cryptography proposals. In May, BitGo and Silence Laboratories simulated a post-quantum transaction using the ML-DSA standard in an MPC system, but the companies have not announced production deployment. Coinbase has recommended a gradual transition, citing signature sizes, transaction fees, network capacity and wallet compatibility.
Cross-chain bridges also need upgrades. Rootstock's PowPeg plans protocol-level post-quantum signatures and hybrid accounts for 2027, followed by assisted account migration in 2028. Meanwhile, NEAR introduced ML-DSA transaction signing in July, and Algorand launched native Falcon-1024 accounts in August.
Stellar's Protocol 30 vote is scheduled for November 23 at 17:00 UTC. CAP-0087 adds three host functions to Soroban for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87, with verification running inside Stellar Core. This allows smart accounts to opt into quantum-resistant approval, but classic accounts and native transaction signatures remain on Ed25519. The ML-DSA signatures are roughly 38 times larger than Ed25519 signatures even at the smallest variant, which creates resource cost concerns for wallet teams.
Stellar's smart accounts can protect funds only if developers require ML-DSA on every spending path. Recovery keys, upgradable contract administrator keys, and mixed signer lists can all weaken that protection if they rely on Ed25519. Stellar's Quantum Preparedness Plan targets native quantum-safe signers for classic accounts in 2027, so regular XLM wallets are not covered by this upgrade.